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Abstract 
Drug testing in American schools 
As the use of illegal drugs has reached epidemic proportions in 
schools, educational leaders in the United States have turned to drug 
testing in attempting to maintain learner discipline. To this end, the 
United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue twice in the 
past eight years. In 1995, the Court permitted drug testing in Acton v. 
Vernonia School District 47J. More recently, in Board of Education 
of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie v. Earls 
(2002), the Court upheld suspicionless drug testing of learners who 
wished to participate in extracurricular activities.  
Even though drug testing has yet to emerge as an issue in South 
Africa, Earls is significant for educational leaders and policy makers in 
South Africa since it involves concerns under the National Policy on 
Privacy. More specifically, under Items 20 and 21 of the South African 
National Policy on the Management of Drug Abuse (SA, 1996b) 
searches and drug testing should only be used where there is 
reasonable suspicion, the same standard applied by American courts. 
However, unlike the United States, the South African policy prohibits 
random searches and/or drug testing. Thus, due to constitutional and 
educational issues that drug testing raises, a timely discussion of this 
matter should be of interest to educational leaders and policy makers 
in South Africa. 
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Opsomming 
Die toetsing vir verbode middels in Amerikaanse skole 
Leerdermisbruik van verbode verdowingsmiddels in Amerikaanse 
skole het sulke afmetings aangeneem dat die toets vir die gebruik 
daarvan in Amerika sterk op die voorgrond getree het. Die hele 
kwessie is gedurende die afgelope agt jaar twee maal in die 
Amerikaanse Hooggeregshof behandel. In 1995 het dié hof in Acton 
v. Vernonia die toets van verbode middels onder leerders toegelaat. 
Meer onlangs, in Board of Education of Independent School 
District No. 92 of Pottawatomie v. Earls (2002) het die hof die 
groenlig gegee vir die sogenaamde blinde toetse van leerders wat aan 
buitemuurse bedrywighede  deelneem. 
Hoewel die hele kwessie van verdowingsmiddeltoetse nog nie sterk 
op die voorgrond getree het in Suid-Afrika nie, is Earls tog betekenis-
vol vir onderwysleiers en beleidmakers in Suid-Afrika. Deursoeking 
word beleidmatig  betrek in die nasionale beleid oor die hantering van 
verbode middels. Daarvolgens word  deursoeking slegs toegelaat op 
grond van ’n redelike vermoede. Anders as in die VSA is blinde 
deursoeking nie toelaatbaar nie. 
1. Introduction1 
The experiences of Olympic and other international athletes (IOC 
Strips ’02 Ski Medals, 2003 WL 60838206; Drug Testers Have 
Designs on New Steroids, 2003 WL 15464675) reveal that random 
drug testing is accepted as a common practice throughout the world. 
Moreover, as the use of illegal drugs has reached epidemic 
proportions in schools, educational leaders in the United States 
have turned to random drug testing in attempting to maintain learner 
discipline. Drug testing has become such an issue that the United 
States Supreme Court has addressed the issue twice in the past 
eight years. In 1995, the Court permitted drug testing in Acton v. 
Vernonia School District 47J. More recently, in Board of Education 
of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie v. Earls 
(Earls) (2002), the Court upheld suspicionless drug testing of 
learners who wished to participate in extracurricular activities.  
As useful as drug testing may be in helping to preserve discipline in 
schools, it is an approach that is not without difficulties. In light of the 
challenges surrounding suspicionless (at random) drug testing, this 
article reviews relevant case law on the Fourth Amendment to the 
                                           
1 Please refer to the Editorial note on p. 554. 
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United States Constitution in school settings. The article pays 
particular attention to the search for and the suspicionless (at 
random) testing of drugs. In this regard special attention will be 
given to Earls v. Board of Education of Independent School District 
No. 92 of Pottawatonie since it is the Court’s most recent pro-
nouncement in this area. Further, even though drug testing has yet 
to emerge as an issue in South Africa, Earls is significant for 
educational leaders and policy makers in South Africa since it 
implicates concerns under the National Policy on Privacy. More 
specifically, under Items 20 and 21 of the South African National 
Policy on the Management of Drug Abuse (SA, 1996b) searches as 
well as drug testing should only be used where there is reasonable 
suspicion – which is similar to the standard applied by American 
courts. However, unlike the United States, the South African 
National Policy on the Management of Drug Abuse by Learners 
(SA,1996b) prohibits random (suspicionless) searches and/or drug 
testing. Thus, due to constitutional and educational issues that drug 
testing raises, a discussion of this timely matter should be of interest 
to educational leaders and policy makers in South Africa.  
2. Learner searches in terms of the Fourth Amendment of 
the US Constitution 
According to the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution (1789), “The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search-
es and seizures, shall not be violated ...”. The Supreme Court first 
addressed the Fourth Amendment in a school setting in New Jersey 
v. T.L.O. (T.L.O.) (1985). When a fourteen year-old learner, identi-
fied as T.L.O., and a friend were accused of violating school rules by 
smoking cigarettes in a high school lavatory, the latter, who admitted 
to smoking, was not brought to the office for a search. Insofar as 
T.L.O. denied smoking and claimed that she did not smoke at all, 
the teacher who confronted her brought her to the assistant 
principal’s office. On opening T.L.O.’s purse, since the assistant 
principal saw her cigarettes “in plain view,” a term borrowed from 
criminal law, he removed them and accused her of lying. Continuing 
the search, the assistant principal discovered cigarette rolling 
papers, a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, a number of plastic 
bags, a substantial quantity of one dollar bills, an index card that 
appeared to be a list of learners who owed T.L.O. money, and two 
letters that implicated her in dealing marijuana. 
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Once T.L.O. confessed to selling marijuana at her high school, a 
state trial court refused to suppress the evidence, adjudicated her as 
delinquent, and sentenced her to a year on probation (In re T.L.O., 
1980). An intermediate appellate court affirmed the denial of the 
motion to suppress the search of T.L.O.’s purse, but vacated and 
remanded since neither the record nor the findings and conclusions 
below were sufficient to evaluate whether she knowingly and 
voluntarily waived her Fifth Amendment rights before confessing (In 
re T.L.O., 1982). The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed in 
declaring that the search of T.L.O.’s purse violated the Fourth 
Amendment (In re T.L.O., 1983). 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed in favour of the State of 
New Jersey. In holding that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures applies in public 
schools, the Court devised a two-part test to evaluate the legality of 
a search. “First, one must consider ‘whether the ... action was 
justified at its inception;’ second, one must determine whether the 
search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place’” 
(T.L.O., 1985:341). 
2.1 Reasonable suspicion 
The Court further explained that a search is justified at its inception 
“when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search 
will turn up evidence that the learner has violated or is violating 
either the law or the rules of the school” (T.L.O., 1985:342). A 
subjective measure based on specific facts, reasonable suspicion is 
significantly less than the probable cause standard that applies to 
the police. Insofar as school, also known as administrative, searches 
are designed to ensure school safety where there are generally 
large numbers of young people and reasonably few adults present, 
educators need only articulable justification in order to proceed.  
A related concern in considering the totality of circumstances means 
that school officials may have to depend on the reliability of 
witnesses in determining whether to search. In assessing sufficiency 
of cause to conduct a search, courts consider such factors as the 
source of the information, a child’s record, the seriousness and 
prevalence of the problem, and the urgency of making the search 
without delay. For example, courts have upheld searches based on 
information supplied by reliable learners (Commonwealth v. Snyder, 
1992; In re L.A., 2001), parents (In re Joseph G., 1995), school 
employees (Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 
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1993), or the police (In re D.E.M., 1999). At least one court upheld a 
search based on an odour emanating from a locker (People v. 
Lanthier, 1971) while another decided that a search was reasonable  
when placing a learner’s book bag on a cabinet produced a metallic 
thud (Matter of Gregory M., 1993). Courts have also generally 
sustained searches of learners’ cars (Anders ex rel. Anders v. Fort 
Wayne Community Schs., 2000; Covington County v. G.W., 2000; 
F.S.E. v. State, 1999), lockers (Zamora v. Pomeroy, 1981; 
Commonwealth v. Carey, 1990; In the Interest of Isiah B., 1993; 
Commonwealth v. Cass, 1998), and backpacks (In re F.B., 1999; In 
re Murray, 2000), for routine administrative purposes connected with 
a school’s general welfare.  
2.2 Reasonable search 
Clarifying the second part of the test, in T.L.O., the Court added that 
“... a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures 
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and 
not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the learner 
and the nature of the infraction” (342).  
An even more intrusive form of searches involves strip searches. In 
apparently the earliest case, a federal trial court in Pennsylvania 
ruled that school officials and a city police chief were not entitled to a 
dismissal of Fourth Amendment claims filed by eight junior high 
school learners who were strip searched in an unsuccessful attempt 
to find a classmate’s missing ring. The court left it for trial, which was 
either unreported or which did not occur, to evaluate whether the 
officials could be liable for the actions of their subordinates (Potts v. 
Wright, 1973). In a case that is more directly on point, a federal trial 
court in New York held that individualized suspicion was necessary 
for a strip search of fifth grade learners in an attempt to locate three 
dollars that were reported missing (Bellnier v. Lund, 1977). 
Following T.L.O., the majority2 but not all3 cases have struck down 
searches for money with4 or without5 personal items rather than 
                                           
2 State ex rel. Galford v. Mark Anthony B. (1993); Kennedy v. Dexter Consol. 
Schs. (2000); Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts (2001); Bell v. Marseilles 
Elementary Sch. (2001).  
3 Williams ex rel. Williams v. Ellington (1991); Cornfield by Lewis v. Consolidated 
High Sch. Dist. No. 230 (1993); Jenkins v. Tallaedga City Bd. of Educ. (1997); 
Cuesta v. School Bd. (2002). 
4 State ex rel. Galford v. Mark Anthony B. (1993).  
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drugs or some other form of contraband. Yet, in one case, the 
Seventh Circuit, an intermediate appellate federal court, upheld a 
strip search of a learner when looking for drugs even though his 
mother refused to consent to a pat down and he became visibly 
agitated when searched. The court was satisfied that since there 
was reasonable suspicion, school officials met both prongs of the 
T.L.O. test. 
2.3 Suspicionless drug testing 
Three years after T.L.O., a dispute from Indiana became the first 
school case on drug testing of learner athletes. After five baseball 
players had tested positive for marijuana, a school board instituted a 
policy calling for random drug testing for learner athletes and cheer 
leaders. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the validity of suspicionless 
testing on the basis that it was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment because school officials instituted sufficient safeguards 
to protect learner privacy (Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 
1988). In upholding the policy, the court maintained that since 
learner athletes and cheer leaders gained enhanced prestige in the 
community, it was not unreasonable to require them to submit to 
drug testing. 
2.3.1  Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton 
Suspicionless drug testing can involve testing all or a random 
sample of a target population. In Vernonia School District 47 J v. 
Acton (Vernonia) (1995), the Supreme Court, in its first case on 
point, upheld a school board policy that included both kinds of 
testing for participants in interscholastic sports. All participants were 
tested at the beginning of the season for their sport; thereafter 10% 
of learners were selected randomly during each week of the season. 
Whether the policy’s goal in Vernonia, to deglamourise drug use, 
was consistent with its implementation is debatable. Despite 
evidence of drug abuse throughout the learner body, the policy was 
directed only at athletes who were at greater risk of immediate 
physical harm due to their activities. The list of drugs that officials 
tested for, amphetamines, marijuana, and cocaine, while harmful to 
athletes, omitted anabolic steroids, two substances that also pose a 
higher risk to learners. The omission of anabolic steroids suggests 
that the purpose of the testing policy was to get rid of drugs that 
affected the entire learner body.  
                                                                                                                           
5 Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts (2001). 
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Perhaps Vernonia was more strategically formulated than policy-
driven since learner athletes were leaders of the drug culture in their 
school. Previously, in New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985), the Court upheld 
individualized reasonable suspicion as the standard for learner 
searches. In Vernonia, the board selected a limited and more 
defensible fact situation involving athletics to assess the consti-
tutionality of suspicionless drug testing. By limiting random drug 
testing to extracurricular athletics, the Vernonia Court created only a 
limited exception to the individualized suspicion testing of T.L.O. 
In Vernonia, the Court addressed the question of individualized 
suspicion that it left unanswered in T.L.O. Acting in response to the 
perception of increased drug use among learners that began during 
the mid-to-late 1980s, the school board in Vernonia, Oregon, 
following up on parental concerns, instituted a drug testing policy for 
learner athletes. The board focused on learner athletes not only 
because they were leaders of the drug culture but also because 
there were incidents where at least two athletes were injured by the 
effects of drugs. The policy, which contained elaborate safeguards 
to protect the privacy rights of the learner athletes, required any 
learner who wished to try out for interscholastic athletic teams to 
submit to a urinalysis drug test.  
When a seventh grade learner was suspended from interscholastic 
athletics because he and his parents refused to comply by signing a 
consent form for drug testing, they challenged his suspension, 
claiming that board officials violated his rights under the Fourth 
Amendment and the state constitution since there was no basis on 
which to believe that he ever used drugs. After a federal trial court in 
Oregon upheld the policy (Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 1992), 
the Ninth Circuit struck it down as unconstitutional (Acton v. 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47 J, 1994). On further review, in Vernonia, the 
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the ruling of the Ninth 
Circuit. 
The Supreme Court applied a three-part balancing test in affirming 
the constitutionality of the policy. First, the Court found that learners 
have a lesser expectation of privacy than ordinary citizens. The 
Court reasoned that learner athletes, in particular, experience dimin-
ished privacy because they are subject to physical examinations 
before becoming eligible to play and dress in open areas of locker 
rooms. Second, the Court indicated the urinalysis was minimally 
intrusive since it was coupled with safeguards that allowed little 
encroachment on the learners’ privacy. Third, given the perception 
of increased drug use, the Court maintained that there was a 
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significant need for the policy. On remand, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the decision of the trial court on the ground “... that the Oregon 
Supreme Court would not offer greater protection under the 
provisions of the Oregon Constitution in this case ....” (Acton v. 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 1995). 
Even after Acton, the circuit courts remained divided over suspicion-
less testing of learners involved in extracurricular activities including 
sports. For example, in a state court, the Supreme Court of 
Colorado struck down random testing of all learners in a school 
band, including those who participated for credit, on the basis that 
such learners had a greater expectation of privacy (Trinidad Sch. 
Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 1998). Further, the Seventh Circuit twice up-
held suspicionless drug testing despite it expressed second 
thoughts about doing so but suggested that, but for its being bound 
by the precedent from the first case, it would have reached a 
different result (Todd v. Rush County Schs., 1998; Joy v. Penn 
Harris Madison Sch. Corp., 2000). Yet, the same court struck down 
drug and alcohol testing of a learner who was suspended for three 
days or more for fighting absent a nexus between use of the banned 
substances and violent behaviour (Willis v. Anderson Community 
Sch. Corp., 1998). Moreover, the Eighth Circuit originally upheld 
random testing but later vacated its judgment as moot when the 
learner moved out of the school district (Miller ex rel. Miller v. 
Wilkes, 1999). The Tenth Circuit, in a case that made its way to the 
Supreme Court as Board of Education of Independent School 
District No. 92 of Pottawatomie v. Earls (Earls) (2002) struck down 
random drug testing as unconstitutional and revealed how the 
disagreement between the circuits leaves educators within their 
jurisdictions without clear guidelines. In a case not involving a 
learner athlete, the Third Circuit affirmed that school officials did not 
violate the rights of a high school learner suspected of being on 
drugs when, pursuant to board policy, she was subjected to 
urinalysis testing (Hedges v. Musco, 2000). Even though the learner 
tested negative for drugs, the court affirmed that school officials did 
not violate the learner’s Fourth-Amendment rights since testing was 
reasonable related to their objective of determining whether she 
used drugs. The court added that even though officials might have 
relied on less invasive means such as testing the learner’s breath or 
saliva, rather than her urine, the test was not excessively intrusive.  
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2.3.2   Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 
of Pottawatomie v. Earls  
A school board in Oklahoma adopted a learner activities drug testing 
policy which required all middle and high school learners to consent 
to urinalysis testing for drugs in order to participate in any extra-
curricular activity. In practice, the policy applied only to learners who 
participated in competitive extracurricular activities sanctioned by 
the state’s secondary schools’ activities association. Learners and 
their parents filed suit under section 1983 alleging that the Policy 
violated their Fourth-Amendment rights because, in adopting it, the 
board neither identified a special need to test individuals who 
participated in extracurricular activities nor addressed a proven 
problem or offered to bring any benefits to learners or their school.  
Relying on Vernonia, a federal trial court (Earls, 2000) granted the 
board’s motion for summary judgment. However, a divided Tenth 
Circuit reversed in favour of the learner (Earls, 2001). On further 
review, in Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 
of Pottawatomie v. Earls (2002), a closely divided Supreme Court 
reversed in favour of the board. 
The Court first considered the nature of the learners’ alleged privacy 
interest, and pointed out that the privacy interests of public school 
learners are limited due to the need of officials to maintain discipline 
and safety. The Court also emphasized that individuals who part-
icipate in extracurricular activities voluntarily subject themselves to 
intrusions on their privacy, whereas their non-participating peers do 
not. As such, it was satisfied that given the limited privacy ex-
pectations of the learners who were affected by the policy, it was 
constitutionally acceptable.  
Turning to the character of the intrusion that the policy imposed, the 
Court briefly reviewed key elements of the policy, noting that it 
included procedures that were virtually identical to those in Acton. If 
anything, it pointed out that this policy afforded even more protection 
because faculty members stood outside of closed restroom stalls, 
unlike Acton where males stood at a urinal, and produced urine 
samples which were then poured into different vials before being 
sent off for testing. The Court also acknowledged that the results 
were kept in separate confidential learner files that were released on 
a need-to-know basis and were not turned over to law enforcement 
officials. Finally, the Court noted that test results did not lead to the 
imposition of disciplinary or academic sanctions but only resulted in 
varying degrees of the loss of the privilege of participating in extra-
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curricular activities. Thus, the Court found that in light of the 
minimally intrusive way in which urine samples were collected along 
with the limited uses for the test results, the invasion into the privacy 
rights of learners was not significant.  
As to the nature and immediacy of the board’s concern and a 
policy’s efficacy in meeting them, the Court recounted how it 
recognized the importance of governmental concern to prevent drug 
use, a problem that has not abated since Vernonia. In so doing the 
Court rebuffed the learners’ claims that drug use was not a problem 
at the school by relying on specific evidence to the contrary offered 
by the board. The Court also indicated that it did not require a 
particularized or pervasive drug problem to be present before 
permitting government officials to conduct suspicionless testing. In 
light of the nationwide epidemic of drug use and the effectiveness of 
testing, he rejected the learners’ argument that testing had to 
presumptively be based on individualized reasonable suspicion 
since this would be less intrusive. In concluding that drug testing 
was a reasonable effective means of addressing the board’s 
legitimate concerns in preventing, deterring, and detecting drug use, 
the Court “express[ed] no opinion as to its wisdom (Earls, 
2002:838).” 
As controversies continue with regard to testing, a ruling from the 
Supreme Court of Indiana reflects the trend that the judiciary 
generally upholds testing for alcohol and drugs but not for other 
substances. More specifically, the court largely upheld a policy that 
permitted random testing of learners who participated in athletics, 
extracurricular, and co-curricular activities as well as on those 
wishing to drive to and from school for alcohol and other non-
tobacco related drugs because it merely barred individuals from 
participating in privileged activities in which they were portrayed as 
role models. In being satisfied that the policy was based on officials’ 
valid interest in deterring learner drug abuse, the court decided that 
it did not violate the unreasonable searches and seizures clause in 
the state constitution (Linke v. Northwestern Sch. Corp., 2002). At 
the same time, the court decided that  officials could not subject 
learners to nicotine testing because of their negligible interest in this 
regard. 
2.3.3  Some reflections on Earls 
In Earls, the Supreme Court avoided making educational policy by 
refusing to serve as the final arbiter of whether school boards should 
adopt random drug testing in response to drug use by learners. 
 C.J. Russo, R.D. Mawdsley & I.J. Oosthuizen 
Koers 68(4) 2003:539-555 549 
Even so, Earls opens the door for more school systems to impose 
random drug testing on extracurricular activities by extending the 
class of learners who can be tested randomly. To this end, drug 
testing in Earls includes not only the athletes who were approved for 
testing in Vernonia, but also the Future Farmers of America (FFA) 
and Future Homemakers of America (FHA) as well as the activities 
that the learner who filed suit was a member of the show choir, 
marching band, academic team, and National Honour Society. 
In Earls, the Court seems to have eliminated the need it identified in 
Vernonia for a school board to demonstrate a special need to 
support its drug testing policy. Evidence in Vernonia based on 
learner drug use surveys and disciplinary referrals that reached 
epidemic proportions revealed not only a drug culture, but also that 
the athletes were the leaders of that culture. In Earls this level of 
evidence was reduced to teacher testimony that “learners appeared 
to be under the influence of drugs and that they had heard learners 
speaking openly about using drugs” (Earls, 2002:834-835). While 
the Court was convinced that this was “sufficient evidence to shore 
up the need for its drug testing programme”, its refusal “to fashion ... 
a constitutional quantum of drug use necessary to show a drug 
problem” (Earls, 2002:836) suggests that the meaning of special 
needs is not the same in Earls as it was in Vernonia. It is not clear 
whether the test in Earls has provided a lowered floor or simply 
eliminated the floor altogether. 
It may be argued that Earls created a new and lower floor of 
evidence to justify testing even if data are anecdotal and based only 
on teacher observations. However, it can be just as easily argued 
that the Court’s reasoning leaves some doubt as to whether any 
evidence is required at all. On the one hand, the Court defined its 
test as not requiring a particularized or pervasive drug problem 
before allowing suspicionless drug testing, but on the other hand 
looked for support for drug testing in Treasury Employees v. Van 
Raab (Van Raab) (1989). In Van Raab, the Court upheld random 
drug testing for customs inspectors, not because there was 
individualized or pervasive evidence of drug use, but since they are 
responsible for stemming the flow of drugs into the country and 
could reasonably have constituted a safety-sensitive group subject 
to suspicionless drug tests. More importantly, the Earls Court cited 
Van Raab for the principle that drug testing can be done on a purely 
preventive basis. As such, it is unclear whether the Court’s standard 
for the use of a random drug test is a lowered floor whereby school 
officials must provide some evidence of learner drug use less than 
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individualized and pervasive or whether the standard eliminates the 
floor altogether since testing can be for purely preventive purposes.  
Another question that Earls leaves unanswered is whether random 
drug testing can be extended to all learners in public schools. In an 
earlier post-Vernonia, but pre-Earls case, a federal trial court in 
Texas struck down both a universal and random drug test policy for 
learners in grades six through twelve (Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 2001). If the Supreme Court were to address a similar set 
of facts now, it is likely that it would come to the same result but for 
a different reason. The Court would likely find that drug testing of all 
learners should be subject to T.L.O.’s individualized reasonable 
suspicion test.  
Beyond the question of the appropriate standard is how the results 
of drug testing are used. The Court thought significant a part of the 
Earls policy that limited the results of testing to participation in 
extracurricular activities. Learners in extracurricular activities who 
tested positive to drugs were not removed from school or reported to 
law-enforcement authorities. As such, it is unclear whether learners 
in extracurricular activities can be suspended or expelled from 
school or whether positive drug test results can be turned over to 
law-enforcement authorities.  
A serious question remains regarding cost limitations for drug 
testing. As some public school systems are struggling to meet 
operating expenses in a sluggish economy, one can only wonder 
how they can afford to test even 10% of their learners per week, as 
was the case in Vernonia. In light of cost issues, it is worth noting 
that at least one school system reported that it spent $70,000 per 
year for weekly random tests of 75 learners’ funds that might 
otherwise have been used for educational programming or staff 
(Dohrman, 1996; Hawkins, 2000). While school officials could lower 
the percentage or number of learners tested each week, at some 
point the number would become so low as to lose its deterrent 
value. In addition, learners who may not feel singled out when they 
are part of a larger group selected for testing, may feel more 
vulnerable and isolated if they are part of a very small number. In 
the end, school officials, now that they can randomly drug test, must 
decide whether they will do so at the expense of lost dollars and the 
possible loss of learners. Further, even if school boards had ample 
funds available, a question can be raised as to whether drug testing 
is the most useful way to use district resources in the battle to end 
reduce, if not eliminate, drug use in schools. 
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An assumption of suspicionless drug testing for extracurricular 
activities is that those activities are not related to the educational 
programme. The dissent’s concern, not addressed earlier in this 
article, about the relationship between the educational programme 
and extracurricular activities, is one that schools that choose to test 
learners randomly will have to face. To this end, it remains to be 
seen whether learners, even if they know that extracurricular 
participation may be important in college admissions, refuse to 
participate if they (and, presumably, their parents) object to random 
drug testing. If there can be a widespread acceptance among 
learners for a drug culture, as in Vernonia, it seems there could be a 
widespread rejection of extracurricular participation if drug testing is 
required. 
3. Conclusion 
Clearly, while school officials have the authority to develop random 
drug testing policies, it is likely that many, if not most, will face 
practical and political problems. Insofar as parent support in creating 
a policy is crucial, school officials would be wise to garner their 
assistance before developing a plan. However, even if most parents 
are supportive, as reflected in Vernonia and Earls, some will 
undoubtedly still object to any form of testing, regardless of what-
ever process is used.  
Beyond the practical problems such as parental support and costs, 
is the legal concern that we have probably not seen the end of drug 
testing litigation in the United States. Given the success of challeng-
es to some drug testing policies under state constitutions (Trinidad 
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 1998), one can expect more litigation in 
this area even as the alarming statistics regarding drug use among 
middle and high school learners are not likely to decrease. Whether 
random drug testing actually deters drug use certainly remains to be 
seen. Even so, as the Earls Court seems to suggest, school officials 
cannot be faulted for adopting measures that they think will help to 
eliminate drug use in schools. 
In light of the mixed blessings and pitfalls that drug testing may 
present it remains to be seen whether educational leaders in South 
Africa will reduce their level of concern about learner privacy and 
permit testing if drug use spreads, or whether they will adopt a more 
proactive stance to help eradicate this pernicious practice before it 
becomes more of a problem. In this regard a leaf or two might be 
taken from the American book. In the first place the contents of the 
American Fourth amendment – affording the people a right to be 
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secured against unreasonable searches and seizures – shows 
certain similarities to section 14 of the South African Bill of Rights 
which determines that everybody has the right to privacy which 
includes the right not to have property searched and possessions 
seized (SA, 1996a). 
As far as suspicion is concerned, the South African National Policy 
on the Management of Drug Abuse by Learners (SA, 1996b) 
specifies that there should be reasonable suspicion. Since the 
concept of reasonable suspicion has not been determined within the 
school context, one might learn from the American experience. 
Reasonable suspicion is not to be seen as being the same high 
standard of proof as probably needed by the police. Examples such 
as information provided by a reliable learner or parents or school 
employees (including teachers) should be enough to constitute 
reasonable suspicion within the South African context.  
The South African National Policy on the Management of Drug 
Abuse by Learners (SA, 1996b) prohibits random (or so-called 
suspicionless) searches. In time to come this policy might prove to 
be overly simplified. In a particular school society where the use of 
illegal drugs poses a serious threat to the physical safety of learners 
and/or the security of learning environment, it might be a more 
sensible approach to make use of random testing – in particular 
where methods such as urinanalysis or saliva tests – which are 
minimally intrusive to learner privacy – are applied.  
Although strip searches are not specifically mentioned in the South 
African National Policy on the Management of Drug Abuse by 
Learners (SA, 1996b) the contents of the provisions indicate that the 
person of the learner may be searched. Similar to the American 
approach, these searches are allowed in certain instances. In South 
Africa, based on reasonable suspicion it has to be carried out by 
person(s) of “the same gender … in a decent and orderly manner”. 
Like in the case of ordinary (non-strip) searches the Policy seems to 
require a person of the learner’s choice (such as for example a 
parent) to be present at the search for support as well as a second 
witness of the same gender. However, it needs to be added that 
such a search has to be conducted with utmost care, taking the 
learner’s right to human dignity and right to privacy into careful 
consideration (SA, 1996a).  
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Editorial note 
According to the policy of the Editorial Board of Koers, all articles 
have to be based on an explicitly formulated philosophical or life-
conceptual framework. While this framework does not need to be 
Christian or reformational, authors of articles are expected to reflect 
on their subject material from such a foundational (philosophical, 
life-conceptual, fundamental, principial) framework, and to use their 
particular framework as a point of reference or for the purpose of 
gleaning normative perspectives from it for their discussions. 
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In the case of this article, however, the authors did not make such a 
pertinent attempt to draft an explicit philosophical framework 
because of the particular scientific paradigm in which they function 
as scholars. The Editorial Board found that, in the case of this 
article, while this is not done in a separate section, the reflections of 
the authors are indeed founded in a certain philosophical per-
spective, a perspective that is integrated in their discussion of the 
theme, and expounded in their views on the subject. The interested 
viewer can judge their views against the backdrop of those 
expounded in the introductory article to this volume entitled “’n 
Beginselgrondslag vir gesag, vryheid, orde en dissipline in die 
onderwysopset van die vroeg-21ste eeu”. The author of the latter 
article outlines a reformational view regarding authority, freedom, 
order and discipline. The reflections of the author of this specific 
Koers article can also be evaluated in the light of publications by, for 
instance, North American authors on discipline such as John van 
Dyk (cf. his book Letters to Lisa. Conversations with a Christian 
teacher, 1997; and The craft of Christian teaching, 2000 – both 
published in Sioux Center by die Dordt College Press), Harro van 
Brummelen (cf. his books Walking with God in the classroom, 1988 
(Burlington : Welch) and Steppingstones to curriculum, 1994 
(Seattle : Alta Vistra College Press) and many others. 
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